To quote extensively from a very pertinent piece by a man with a rare combination of combat experience in South East Asia, a novelists' psychological acuity and an experienced practitioner of the inner workings of the US legislative process:
(Brownie points for reading the author's full piece, pondering, then correcting me as I pontificate freely and otherwise unchecked in past, future (and present. can't resist.) posts.)
"But there is room for engagement. Many Asian countries — China among them — do not even allow opposition parties. The National League for Democracy might consider the advantages of participation as part of a longer-term political strategy. And the United States could invigorate the debate with an offer to help assist the electoral process. The Myanmar government’s answer to such an offer would be revealing.
"[T]he United States needs to develop clearly articulated standards for its relations with the nondemocratic world. Our distinct policies toward different countries amount to a form of situational ethics that does not translate well into clear-headed diplomacy. We must talk to Myanmar’s leaders. This does not mean that we should abandon our aspirations for a free and open Burmese society, but that our goal will be achieved only through a different course of action.
...Finally, with respect to reducing sanctions, we should proceed carefully but immediately. If there is reciprocation from the government of Myanmar in terms of removing the obstacles that now confront us, there would be several ways for our two governments to move forward. We could begin with humanitarian projects. We might also seek cooperation on our long-held desire to recover the remains of World War II airmen at crash sites in the country’s north."
It seems tautologous to credit a fait accompli with kicking US foreign policy from inertial stagnancy to movement. But action breeds action and Webb's visit to Burma seems to have cracked open an opportunity for the West and the rest. His was no pony show insofar as it doubled as a chance for a US politician to hear, on Burmese soil, from major players whose relative ratio of heroism to villainy would plot nicely along an exponential growth curve. In other words, no exiles whispering into a Westerner's ear with ideas poisoned by long absence from -and scerlotic visions of - life inside. Webb's audience offered him a fresh, insider vision on a regime otherwise frozen into oblivion, at an obvious loss to US intelligence.
US intelligence on Burma? Who cares? By way of answer -- International Relations, 101, the Billiard Ball theory (skewed): One presumes it would be outside the interests of a vast Western power to wake up near the black hole in corner-left of the Asian billiard table, knocked out of place by a strategically positioned resource rich country that offers a vital political, economic and military outhouse for the Middle Kingdom and a nuclear tech. trading partner for out-of-work Muscovites nostalgic for a bit of Sputnik-era scientific bravado.
Cast your mind back to the fine-tuned pre-diplomacy required to open relations between the US and China in 1973. It took a mightily creative exchange of Ping Pong players, alongside a careful intervention of Pakistani emissaries (and we know not what expense in snail mail postage). Given the ritual subtletly of Beijing political messaging, and the signal lack thereof from big, brash, earnest America, it doubtless also took a Zhang and a Kissinger to gently discover the right dance steps to start the much celebrated Sino-US thaw. Naturally that historical analogy falls flat on at least ten"p" counts (power, population, political indeterminacy, party count, proximity to major US nemesis, potential to counterbalance proximal nemisis -- well okay that's six) . But the lesson endures: transnational communication shutdowns make starting points for negotiation a mite difficult.
The current against which Webb swims accepts with little question the conventional wisdom that dialogue with the junta would offer it symbolic legitimization, and thereby vindicate its annullment of the election results of 1990 in which Suu Kyi's party, the NLD, surged to victory. In Webb's defence, I would respectfully submit that we rest an ear on Burmese rice paddy and listen hard for the quiet seismic trembles of the opposition and everyone between. Accept that it is possible that in the intervening years (ie. nearly 20 years), they might have changed their thinking. Accept that they recognize the impossibility of watching their country slide ever deeper into poverty and pain. The most hardline of the junta's in-country critics, Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, are clamoring for dialogue. A dialogue long forbidden to them, until an opening appeared like a wormhole in the form of next year's elections. A dialogue that begins admittedly with the unlikely premise of releasing the 2100 poltical prisoners and Aung San Suu Kyi. But there is a starting point, and we leave it to the mysterious alchemy of diplomat-negotiators to find the particular formula for turning cold-faced silence into a process. For transforming stangant internia into kinetic interia.